Brasil e EUA conversam para melhorar atuação no Haiti; leia em inglês

1/22/2010 22:21

10BRASILIA19
Embassy Brasilia
CONFIDENTIAL 10BRASILIA62|10STATE6391 VZCZCXRO5778OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRSDE RUEHBR #0019/01 0222231ZNY CCCCC ZZHO R 222221Z JAN 10FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIATO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0343INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTSRUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0006RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRORUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000019 SIPDIS STATE FOR HAITI TASK FORCE, WHA, USAID AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/22 TAGS: EAID, PREL, MASS, BR, HA SUBJECT: SENIOR BRAZIL OFFICIALS PRAISE COOPERATION, SEEK CLOSER COORDINATION IN HAITI REF: STATE 06391; BRASILIA 0062 CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., State, Embassy Brasilia; REASON: 1.4, (D)

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1. (C) In separate meetings with the Charge on January 22, Chief of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) General Staff Admiral Joao Afonso Prado Maia de Faria ("ADM Prado Maia") and Foreign Ministry (MRE) Under Secretary for Latin America Antonio Simoes both said they saw no conflict between the United States and Brazil. Both saw an opportunity for our governments to work more closely together, noted that the media was playing up supposed friction between us, and stressed their interest in greater coordination. In advance of the Montreal foreign ministers' meeting on January 25, President Lula made available 375 million reais (approximately US$208 million) to support Brazil's relief effort to Haiti, and committed to send up to an additional 1300 troops to support MINUSTAH. End Summary. MOD: GOOD COOPERATION BETWEEN FORCES, HOPE FOR MORE

2. (C) Charge d'Affaires, accompanied by the Defense Attache, Military Liaison Office Chief and Air Attache, met with Prado Maia (the equivalent in Brazil of the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to discuss Brazilian and United States cooperative efforts in the ongoing post-earthquake Haitian humanitarian crisis. After receiving U.S. official condolences for the loss of Brazilian civilian, diplomatic, and military lives as a result of the earthquake, Prado Maia thanked the United States for its cooperation with MINUSTAH and Brazil. According to Prado Maia, in a video teleconference held on January 20 with the "Crisis Cabinet" stood up by President Lula specifically for the Haiti crisis, MINUSTAH Commander Lieutenant General Floriano Peixoto was effusive in his praise of U.S. cooperation with MINUSTAH and Brazilian forces, as well as of his personal relationship with Lieutenant General Keen. Peixoto had said that coordination and cooperation were going extremely well under very trying circumstances. Prado Maia thanked the United States for our efforts to reach out and cooperate with MINUSTAH and Peixoto. He pointed out that the press was making much of supposed friction between our two forces, but that was clearly untrue, according to Peixoto.

3. (C) Prado Maia said Brazil would be replacing its contingent in Haiti - despite UN objections - starting this weekend, albeit eight days later than originally planned because of the earthquake. He did not see this as a problem given the Brazilian military extensively prepares its troops prior to deployment for duty in MINUSTAH. He added that the Brazilian Navy, slow to get into the fray, was sending a medical surgical team and one SUPER PUMA cargo helicopter to Haiti on an Italian Aircraft Carrier passing through Brazilian waters next week en route to Haiti. Finally, Prado Maia closed by expressing the desire of the Brazilian Defense Ministry and Armed Forces to coordinate and cooperate more in Haiti with the United States as each country built up forces to assist the Haitians.

4. (C) Charge, DATT, and MLO Chief briefed Prado Maia on the possibilities and benefits of signing an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to facilitate logistics for the mission in Haiti. Prado Maia expressed interest in learning more and speculated that the Crisis Cabinet, on which he holds a seat, might be a good venue to fast track the agreement if both sides could settle the language. (Note: Post has a boiler-plate of the ACSA in Portuguese and will get it over to Prado Maia first thing next week. End note.) MRE: NO CONFLICT, BUT MORE COMMUNICATION IMPORTANT

5. (C) Charge, accompanied by POLCOUNS, began her discussion of Haiti with Simoes by delivering points ref A regarding the importance of following ICAO procedures in requesting slots at Port-au-Prince airport, and encouraged Simoes to come directly to her (or to POLCOUNS as back-up) regarding any VIP visitors so she could ensure appropriate handling. Simoes said he understood, and would seek to ensure the protocols were followed even as he gave a "heads up" to her on critical flights.

6. (C) Simoes said he sees in the Haiti relief effort an opportunity to further improve U.S.-Brazilian cooperation, and noted he had said as much in a recent television interview. "We must seize the opportunity," he said, stressing that Brazil "is not competing with the United States" and is very happy with U.S. BRASILIA 00000019 002 OF 002 efforts. He noted, however, that the media and certain countries in the region (he mentioned Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia) were seeking to exploit the U.S. presence and small incidents to create conflict between us.

7. (C) To manage the regional and media perceptions better, Simoes stressed the need for "increased channels of communication" so that neither Brazil nor MINUSTAH will be surprised by U.S. actions. He noted that the size and actions of the U.S. contingent could create problems-he cited the rumors of a U.S. occupation of Haiti and the landing of a U.S. helicopter on the lawn of the presidential palace as examples-and suggested that greater communication could have allowed MINUSTAH and Brazil to better support the U.S. actions. Simoes suggested that having an official in State or the White House designated to advise other active governments of U.S. actions in and regarding Haiti would be one way to improve communication. He also suggested that MINUSTAH liaison officers with U.S. forces-he specifically mentioned the USS Carl Vinson-could help. "The reason is not to change U.S. plans," he stressed, "but to help execute them successfully." LULA RELEASES NEW MONIES TO SUPPORT GOB EFFORTS

8. (SBU) In advance of the Montreal Foreign Ministers meeting, President Lula made available late on January 21 R$375 million (approximately US$ 208 million) to support MOD, MRE, and the Ministry of Health (MOH) efforts regarding Haiti. This includes the US$15 million already announced by MRE for relief supplies. R$135 million (approximately US$75 million) will go to MOH for ten Immediate Care Units and the acquisition of fifty ambulances. R$205 million (approximately US$114 million) will go to MOD to support the Brazilian troop presence. Lula has also decided to increase Brazil's MINUSTAH contingent by 900 troops, with an additional reserve of 400 troops-up to double its current forces in MINUSTAH. Simoes said the Montreal Foreign Ministers meeting would be a good opportunity to demonstrate the multilateral nature of efforts in Haiti. He suggested there should be a European presence, as well; "we need to open it up and encourage others to get involved," he said. COMMENT: DESIRE FOR MORE COORDINATION BEHIND THE SMILES

9. (C) The meetings between the Charge and both Prado Maia and Simoes were friendly and productive, much like those she has held with other senior GOB officials this week (ref B). Both were open to forwarding our relationship and sought to be helpful in offering suggestions. Clearly, we have turned a corner on the earlier friction caused by coordination problems at the Port-au-Prince airport, and the GOB is determined to see this as an opportunity both to increase cooperation with the USG and to enhance its own leadership standing. At the same time, the desire for greater communication by the USG with MINUSTAH, in the first instance, and the GOB in the second, is clear.

10. (C) Heading into the Montreal meeting, Brazil believes it has earned, through its long-term commitment to leading MINUSTAH and its mounting efforts to Haiti in the wake of the earthquake, the right to full partnership in the relief and reconstruction of Haiti going forward. The feeling seems to persist that the USG is not treating Brazil in that way. Continued USG acknowledgment of Brazil's leadership in Haiti and a commitment to communication and coordination will go a long way toward ensuring GOB support for USG

communication and coordination will go a long way toward ensuring GOB support for USG efforts. KUBISKE 2010-01-22 5 conversa com oficiais, melhor coordenação no Haiti HAITI