Telegrama afirma que senador pediu reunião com embaixador sobre Irã; leia em inglês

ID 129789

11/13/2007 14:41

07BRASILIA2132

Embassy Brasília

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

07BUENOSAIRES2191

Senador Heráclito Fortes quis armar Brasil contra Venezuela
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Leia íntegra dos arquivos sobre o Brasil obtidos pela Folha

VZCZCXRO9093PP RUEHRGDE RUEHBR #2132/01 3171441ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 131441Z NOV 07 ZDKFM AMEMBASSY BRASILIATO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0429INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0012RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNARHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDCRUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6402RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4378RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5121RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3862RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 1361RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 5760RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3635RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7095RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0343RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2339RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 6532RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7356RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5418RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1158RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDCRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002132 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDRESSEES ADDED SIPDIS UNVIE FOR AMB GREG SHULTE DOE FOR DOE/NNSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017 TAGS: PREL, MASS, BR, VE, XR, RS, IR SUBJECT: IRAN-RUSSIA-VENEZUELA TRIANGLE THREATENS REGIONAL STABILITY REF: BUENOS AIRES 2191 BRASILIA 00002132 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary. Iran, Russia, and Venezuela are involved in an open and growing collaboration with a common purpose to make more arms available to radical populist governments and spread anti-American ideology in the region, according to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations and National Defense committee. He is "truly concerned" and urges the USG to be more engaged "before it is too late." The chairman said presidential foreign policy adviser Marco Aurelio Garcia strongly recommended Ahmadinejad visit Brazil. Chairman Fortes surmised that Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was less receptive to the visit. Fortes noted that with the increasing wealth of oil-producing states, there are some that will support Russian arms purchases, and in conversation, the Deputy Minister alluded that perhaps Ecuador and even Brazil could become beneficiaries. End summary.

2. (C) During a November 5 phone call, Senator Heraclito Fortes (Democrats Party, opposition; of Piaui) asked the Ambassador to meet with him urgently to raise a matter he could not discuss on the telephone. In a meeting that afternoon, which continued the next morning, Fortes told the Ambassador, poloff, and assistant army attache that he is "truly concerned" about Iranian and Venezuelan activities in the region, including financing "friendship organizations" between congresses and even potentially financing arms sales. He described a recent meeting with the Iranian Deputy Minister for Petroleum and former Ambassador to Brazil who sought "cooperation" with Brazil, the nature of which "depends on Brazil." (Note: This is Dr. Mansour Moazami, Iranian Ambassador to Brazil from 2000 until about 2003. End note.) He spoke of Iran's growing relationship with Venezuela and Ecuador and even indicated that the recent trip of President Putin to Iran was extremely successful and dealt with many of the difficult issues that had to be resolved. In mentioning arms sales, Chairman Fortes again underscored Iran's interest in helping Brazil, depending on Brazil own interest. The Deputy Minister told Fortes that Iran already has agreements with Bolivia and Ecuador, but it was not made clear to Fortes whether these were arms agreements.

Connecting the Dots

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3. (C) Fortes sees a sequence of dots showing more Venezuelan influence and interference in the region, Iranian support for Caracas, La Paz, and Quito, and the specter of Russian arms in the region.

4. (C) Fortes said the Iranian Deputy Minister described President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to Iran as very good, resolving many differences between them; the Iranian mentioned Russian arms sales to Venezuela, Russian relations with Venezuela, as well as Venezuelan support for Bolivian and Ecuador, praised Venezuela, and mentioned Venezuela's recent acquisition of 26 warplanes, claiming they are to maintain peace. The Deputy Minister, a former ambassador to Brazil and one who knows Brazil, told Fortes it is up to Brazil to determine how it wanted to work with Iran, and through thinly veiled references asked the chairman of the Foreign Relations and National Defense Committee if he was interested in reviving the Friendship Group that previously had as its leader a former senator of, as Fortes implied, questionable character. Fortes said he had never been approached that way in his career. He said the moribund group will likely be revived in the Senate without his support. Fortes said he believed there was pressure from unknown quarters within Brazil to purchase Russian arms, adding that the Air Force Commander, General Juniti Saito, told him if he (Saito) were pushed to buy Russian weapons he BRASILIA 00002132 002.3 OF 003 would have no option, and Fortes thought it would be a huge mistake.

5. (C) Fortes continued pointing out worrisome signs: leftist Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Peruvian deputies who are trying to reactivate the Caracas-based Amazonian Parliament (Parlamaz) were visiting Brasilia Nov 5-8 to lobby the Brazilian Congress, and there are now "Bolivarian circles" in Brazil that media have reported as being under Venezuelan tutelage. Official Venezuelan diplomacy is increasingly commercial, with huge contracts for firms such as Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht, who then lobby for Venezuela, Fortes noted. The expanded availability of the type of arms in Venezuela that could be used for populist causes in Brazil was also of concern to the senator. Fortes said it may not be coincidental that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak arrived in Brasilia the same day as Iranian Deputy Petroluem Minister and he speculated there may have been a three-way meeting with Brazilians, the Russian, and the Iranian.

6. (S) Iranian outreach plans in the region include another Ahmadinejad trip including Brazil, probably for the next inauguration of a Latin American president, making the trip a springboard for Iranian regional diplomacy, Fortes said. (Note: Ahmadinejad canceled a scheduled visit here last September on short notice.) Presidential foreign policy adviser Marco Aurelio Garcia supported the Iranian president's visit, which may not have been supported by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, Fortes said, and the Iranian Deputy Minister, who was in the traveling delegation to Caracas and La Paz, said he tried everything up to the last minute to get it reinstated. Fortes added that the Deputy Minister was very disappointed at the cancellation, especially since an Iranian advance team was already on the ground in Brasilia. The senator indicated that he thought that despite Garcia's strong support for the Ahmadinejad visit, Celso Amorim may have intereceded due to the sensitivities. Sensitive reporting indicates, though that the reasons were other. "You Are Children"

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7. (C) Fortes strongly urged the USG to engage much more "before it is too late." The USG is "indifferent" to what is happening in the region and he urged the USG to take notice of Venezuelan, Russian, and Iranian plans in the region, saying, "You are children: you ignore a problem until it is well along and then it is too late." He suggested the USG adopt a plan for regional integration and promote arms manufacturing partnerships with Brazil and Argentina to arm the region, and said it could be done indirectly through arms firms without publicly linking the USG to the increased arms sales.

8. (S) Comment. Iranian and Venezuelan influence in Brazil and the region is certainly growing and mutually reinforcing, and Chairman Fortes is correct that there are differing views on how to engage Iran, but clearly Brazil will be increasingly sensitive to Iranian interests. It is also interesting to recall President Lula's remarks on the margins of the last UN General Assembly when he said Iran was not in violation of any UN guidelines with its nuclear program, as well as Brazil's abstention on November 7 in the Interpol vote to issue international capture notices for Iranian officials accused in the AMIA bombing (reftel). Chairman Fortes's concerns parallel recent views we have heard reporting on increasing Brazilian concerns over Venezuelan arms purchases, the lack of a modernized Brazilian defense capability, and increasing engagement of Venezuelan diplomats in Brazil funding Bolivarian Circles and populist organizations. Chairman Fortes is not alone in his feeling, especially given the recent remarks of former president and BRASILIA 00002132 003.2 OF 003 sitting senator Jose Sarney, a leader of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party. Sobel